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On Discretion in the Application of Rules:  
 






Adjudicators typically enjoy some power of discretion in their conduct of 
litigation and in their ultimate decisions in cases.  More broadly, individuals who have 
been given a decisionmaking role by the state or by an organization generally possess a 
certain freedom of authority.  When police officers consider whether or not to issue 
tickets to drivers, when supervisors contemplate whether or not to promote employees, or 
when college admissions officers determine whether or not to accept applicants, their 
decisions are to a degree theirs to make.  As a matter of common observation, it seems 
that our legal and other rule-based systems have the feature that those who actually apply 
rules are accorded a measure of discretionary sway.      
The object of this article is to analyze discretion as a feature of the design of 
rule-guided systems.  That is, given that rules have to be administered by some group of 
persons – called adjudicators for expositional convenience – and given that the 
adjudicators’ goals and understandings may be different from society’s or whatever is the 
entity whose welfare is at issue, is it or is it not desirable for this entity to allocate 
discretionary power to the adjudicators?  After all, it is always possible for the 
rule-guided system to be fashioned in such a way that adjudicators do not hold any 
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deviation.  If so, the function of adjudicators would be limited to verification of the 
information needed to apply the rules; once this were done, their task would be complete.  
If, though, an adjudicator is not limited to verifying information that then would dictate 
his decision, but instead he is sometimes able to make a choice, he is said to have 
discretion.  I will examine the advantage of granting discretion to adjudicators, 
suggesting that the advantage is often substantial; this will help to explain the existence 
of discretion that we ordinarily see in rule-guided systems.  I will also investigate the 
disadvantages of discretion and how discretion can be controlled to ameliorate its 
disadvantages.  
The kernel of the rationale for granting discretion to adjudicators is familiar: 
discretion allows adjudicators to make decisions on the basis of information that is not 
included in the rule, such as the degree of remorse shown by a criminal defendant, but 
that it would be socially desirable for the decisions to reflect (perhaps the punishment 
should be lower the greater the degree of remorse).
1
This basic argument, however, immediately raises a question.  Namely, why is the 
information that it is potentially desirable for adjudicators with discretion to employ in 
their decisions not included in rules in the first place?  Why is the degree of remorse 
displayed by a criminal defendant not included in the rule that the adjudicator is to apply 
in sentencing him?  Inclusion of such information in rules would eliminate the need for 
discretion.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
1 For concreteness, I will usually speak of rules as legal and refer to society’s objectives, even 
though, as indicated, the issue of discretion applies more generally.   
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reviewing authority (notably, an appeals court) to verify, making its inclusion in a rule 
effectively unworkable.  If a defendant’s remorsefulness cannot be authenticated by a 
reviewing authority (perhaps because it is too expensive for an appeals court to rehear 
testimony), then the rule cannot include remorsefulness (or can only do so nominally) 
since there would be no way to determine whether the rule was really obeyed.  The 
second reason that a rule may not include information of possible relevance to socially 
desirable decisions is that the framers of a rule are not be able to foresee all the relevant 
particulars that may arise; given the costs to framers of formulating and describing rules, 
the rules cannot be too detailed.  For instance, lawmakers might stipulate that the speed 
limit is 65 m.p.h. except in an “emergency,” but without defining the various events that 
constitute emergencies.   (As will be seen, that there are two distinct reasons for 
discretion is more than an observation; the ability to control discretion will be different 
depending on the which of the two reasons applies.) 
Returning to the main argument, it seems inevitable that, for the two reasons just 
noted, there will be information that is not included in rules but that society would in 
principle wish to be taken into account in decisions.  This is why there is potential value 
in permitting discretion to adjudicators.  
The disadvantage of permitting discretion concerns discretionary deviation: that 
adjudicators may not use the information as society wants but rather to further their own 
objectives (perhaps adjudicators favor more lenient punishment than does society, 
perhaps adjudicators will take bribes in exchange for more lenient punishment) or to 
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that society wants to place greater weight on remorsefulness than it truly does).   
In the analysis that follows, I first examine in a general way the 
information-related advantage of permitting discretion and compare it to the disadvantage 
of discretionary deviation.  In so doing, I attempt to elucidate the conditions under which 
discretion is a socially desirable feature of the design of a rule-guided system.  
I next take up the question of how discretionary deviation can be ameliorated and 
controlled.  Discretion can be directly controlled by limitation of its scope.  For instance, 
the sentence for a crime could be required to lie in the range between one and five years.  
Such direct control of discretion may be useful because, in rough terms, it prevents 
substantial discretionary deviation (a sentence of less than one year or more than five 
years).  But limiting the scope of discretion is a relatively blunt instrument for solving the 
problems of discretionary deviation because, by definition, it has no effect on deviation 
within the allowed scope of decisions (sentences between one and five years) and also 
because decisions outside the permitted bounds are occasionally desirable. 
Another way in which discretion can be constrained is through the use of 
standards, by which is meant principles or policies that are intended to guide the exercise 
of discretion but which are to some degree indefinite (otherwise they would be rules).  
The instruction to a court to allow an excuse for an “emergency” in determining whether 
traveling over 65 m.p.h. will be penalized might be considered a standard: it provides 
help to the court in ascertaining when to exercise discretion and thus not to penalize a 
person for exceeding 65 m.p.h.; but the instruction is to some degree indefinite since, as 
noted above, “emergency” is not a self-defining term.  The point that is developed is that 
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way.  It is emphasized, however, that the primary utility of standards arises where the 
reason for discretion is that the framers of rules are not able to formulate them in a 
detailed way – here standards constitute an imperfect but helpful substitute for complete 
rules (such as a rule that specifically delineated all possible emergencies).  When the 
reason for discretion is that a variable is not observable, however, standards are not 
generally helpful. 
Three indirect methods of ameliorating discretionary deviation are then examined. 
The first is changing the incentives of adjudicators, by giving them a reward or imposing 
a penalty on them that is based on their decisions.  For instance, if there is a problem of 
light sentencing, adjudicators could be given enhanced promotion possibilities for 
imposing higher sentences.  This technique can counter discretionary deviation in a 
broader and also in a more nuanced way than limiting the scope of discretion, since 
decision-based incentives may influence a wide range of decisions (they might lead a 
judge to increase somewhat all sentences, whereas limiting the scope of discretion could 
only raise sentences by ruling out sentences below a threshold).  But altering 
adjudicators’ incentives generally cannot solve the problem of discretionary deviation 
because decision-based incentives cannot always perfectly mirror the social goals.   
A second indirect means of controlling discretion is through monitoring of 
adjudication, such as by conducting spotchecks of proceedings.  Monitoring in 
combination with imposition of sanctions for discovered discretionary deviation can 
induce better decisionmaking.  However, this is a costly process.  
  5
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressA third indirect method of control of discretionary deviation is the appeals 
process, whereby disappointed litigants may bring appeals to a reviewing court.  Like 
monitoring, the prospect of appeal and reversal can induce better decisionmaking by 
adjudicators.  But the appeals process is different from monitoring in that appeals are 
instigated by disappointed litigants.  This can be an advantage if disappointed litigants are 
more likely to make appeals when discretionary deviation has occurred than would be 
true of a randomly chosen case.  But that is not always a good hypothesis, and for this 
and other reasons the comparison of appeals to monitoring as methods of reducing 
discretionary deviation becomes complicated. 
The foregoing points are developed informally, but employing a stylized model, 
in Section 2 of the article, and formally in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
Before proceeding, it should be acknowledged that much has been written on the 
subject of discretion by legal commentators, scholars, and philosophers,
2 and this article 
does not seek to achieve any striking novelty.  At least since Aristotle, it has been 
observed that the possible need for discretion arises because of the limited capacity of 
lawgivers to specify the details of rules.
3  Moreover, it is a virtual commonplace to say 
that, although granting adjudicators discretion allows additional information to be 
employed by them, doing so has the drawback that the information may not influence 
decisions desirably.
4   Even though many of the basic themes of the analysis of the 
rationale for, and disadvantages of, discretion have long been recognized, I believe that 
                                                 
2 [Modern references include: Davis, Dworkin, Hart, Raz, Schauer.] 
 
3 [“[S]ome things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the 
origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule.  For matters of detail about 
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can be controlled will prove clarifying.
5   
2. Informal Analysis 
A.  Basic model  
Let me begin by describing a set of assumptions about decisionmaking in a 
rule-guided system that will allow us to analyze in a straightforward way basic issues 
about its design and in particular to study issues concerning the discretion of 
decisionmakers.  The assumptions constitute a model that I believe to be essentially the 
simplest in which discretion can be analyzed. 
There is a population of individuals who are affected by the decisions made by the 
system.  This population could be comprised of the individuals addressed by a legal 
system or a private decisionmaking system (like the system that decides on college 
admissions).   
There is an entity overseeing the design of the system and in whose interest the 
system is conceived to operate.  This entity could be considered to be society when the 
system is interpreted to be the legal system; otherwise, it is a relevant organization (like a 
college).  The entity is assumed to have an objective, namely, its welfare, and to design 
the system to maximize its welfare (or its expected welfare). 
The level of welfare associated with a particular decision is a function of a 
(perhaps lengthy) list of potentially relevant variables.  For example, the level of  social 
welfare associated with a decision about a criminal sanction might include all the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 It should also be mentioned that the principal and agent literature of economics bears on the 
subject of discretion, for the adjudicator may be considered an agent of society.  I discuss the relationship 
of this literature to the model of discretion in Section 3G. 
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things, these variables may help to determine the deterrent and incapacitative 
consequences of punishment. 
The decisions are made by individuals called adjudicators, rather than somehow 
directly by the entity.  The justification for this assumption is that it may be impractical 
for the entity to make the decisions on account of their volume; moreover, the entity may 
be fictitious (there is no individual whom we can identify as “society”).  Adjudicators are 
assumed to have their own goals, which may be distinct from that of the entity; each 
adjudicator maximizes his utility.    
In order to describe the making of decisions by adjudicators, we must further 
discuss the variables.  We will assume that a subset of the variables are called included 
variables, because they may be included in what we will call a general rule that the 
adjudicators must obey (a discussion of why they must obey the rule, and how this comes 
about, is deferred to section C below).  The general rule specifies the scope of permissible 
decisions, that is, the set of decisions in which the adjudicator’s decision must lie, given 
the included variables.   For instance, the included variables might be the age of the 
criminal defendant, some prominent aspects of the act done, and the harm caused to the 
victim, and the general rule might say that given the included variables, the sentence must 
be between one and five years.  If the permissible scope of decisions consists of more 
than one element (as it does when the sentence can be between one and five years), we 
say that the adjudicator has discretion.  If the permissible scope of decisions is just one 
decision (such as a term of precisely 3 years), then the adjudicator has no discretion, and 
we call a rule that gives no discretion a definite rule.  
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the included variables but also the unincluded variables.  
I end the description of the basic model at this point and take up the question of 
when discretion is desirable to grant.  Below, I will amplify the basic model in various 
ways. 
B.  The possible desirability of permitting discretion  
To determine whether discretion is desirable to allow, we must compare the 
expected welfare under the best definite rule – a rule not permitting discretion – to 
expected welfare under the best rule allowing discretion.   
To understand the comparison, it will be helpful to examine a situation in which 
there is a single unincluded variable which has just two possible values.  For 
concreteness, imagine that a defendant who has come before a court has committed theft 
(this is the included variable on which the decision may be based) and either displays 
remorse or does not (this is the unincluded variable).  The possible decisions concern the 
sentence length.   Social welfare depends on whether or not the person displays remorse 
and on the sentence length; the best sentence is lower if he displayed remorse.   
Consider the case of a definite rule, not allowing discretion.  If discretion is not 
allowed, a single sentence must be employed; the adjudicator’s “decision” is prescribed.  
The best sentence will be the one that constitutes the most desirable compromise between 
that which would be appropriate for the defendant who shows remorse and that which 




Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press________________________________________________________________   
Example 1.   Suppose that there are three possible sentences: low, medium, and 
high.  Social welfare as a function of the sentence length and degree of remorse is 
as shown in the table below. 
 







No remorse          2       10        11 
Remorse        12         6           1 
 
Thus, the best sentence for a defendant who exhibits no remorse is high, and the 
best sentence for a defendant who displays remorse is low (the levels of welfare 
for the two socially optimal sentences are italicized).  Suppose that the fraction of 
defendants who display no remorse is 50% and that the fraction who display 
remorse is 50%.  Under a definite rule, a single sentence must be chosen, and the 
question is what is the optimal sentence?  If a low sentence is chosen, expected 
welfare would be 50%x2 + 50%x12 =  7.  If a medium sentence is selected, 
expected welfare would be 50%x10 + 50%x6 = 8.  If a high sentence is imposed, 
expected welfare would be 50%x11 + 50%x1 =  6.  Hence, the optimal sentence is 
a medium sentence.  The reason, in essence, is that both of the other choices of 
sentence have substantial disadvantages: if a low sentence were chosen, a very 
low level of welfare would result if the defendant showed no remorse; and if a 
high sentence were chosen, a very low level of welfare would result if the 
defendant showed remorse.  Under a medium sanction both of these very bad 
outcomes are avoided, even though the medium sanction is not best for either of 
the two possible degrees of remorse.   
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different, the optimal sentence would change.  If the percentage of no remorse 
defendants were above 83.33%, then the best sentence would be high, and if the 
percentage of remorseful defendants were above 57.14%, then the optimal 
sentence would be low.  Likewise if the levels of social welfare were different, the 
optimal sentence might change. 
______________________________________________________________   
As the example shows, the best decision under the definite rule reflects the probabilities 
of the different values of the unincluded variable, the degree of remorse.  In general, the 
best decision cannot be best for all the possible values of the unincluded variable, and in 
the example, when the best decision is the medium sentence, that is never best even 
though it leads to the best leve of expected welfare. 
  Next consider the case where discretion is allowed.  For simplicity, let us 
investigate only giving the adjudicator complete discretion, the freedom to choose any 
sentence length.
6  In this case, the adjudicator can and generally will react to the 
information that he observes about the degree of remorse.  How the adjudicator’s 
decision will reflect this depends on his own preferences.  The next example illustrates 
this point and whether, in view of it, discretion is better to allow than to employ the best 
definite rule. 
________________________________________________________   
Example 2.   Assume first that the adjudicator’s preferences are such that he will 
be best off selecting the high sentence if no remorse is shown and the low 
                                                 
6 [The adjudicator’s scope of discretion could be limited to, say, just the low or the medium 
sentence length.  Variation of the scope of discretion will be discussed below; see section 2F.]  
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7  In other words, he will choose the socially best 
sentences as a function of the degree of remorse.  Then, given that he has 
discretion to choose the sentence, expected welfare will be 50%x12 + 50%x11 = 
11.5.  Since this exceeds 8, expected social welfare under the best definite 
sentence, the medium sentence (see Example 1), we have verified that it is best to 
allow discretion in this case.  Of course, it must be better to do so, since the 
assumption is that the adjudicator always selects the socially optimal sentence. 
  Now assume that the adjudicator would pick the medium sentence for the 
defendant who shows no remorse and the low sanction for the defendant who 
displays remorse – the adjudicator is somewhat “biased” toward low sanctions.  In 
this case, expected social welfare is 50%x10 + 50%x12 = 11.   Since this exceeds 
8, it is again best to allow discretion, even though the adjudicator does not select 
what is socially optimal all the time.  He does better than the definite rule since, 
when the defendant is remorseful, he selects the low sanction. 
  Assume next that the adjudicator will always impose the low sanction; 
whether or not the defendant is remorseful, the sentence would be the low one.  
Then expected social welfare will be 50%x2 + 50%x12 = 7, which is worse than 
the definite rule.  The reason that in this case the definite rule is superior is that 
the disadvantage of the low sentence when the defendant shows no remorse is so 
substantial. 
___________________________________________________________    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 [For present purposes, it is not necessary to be explicit about the preferences or circumstances 
that lead the adjudicator to pick what he does; it is enough to say what sentences he would choose.  In the 
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not depends on the closeness of the adjudicator’s personally optimal choices to society’s 
best choices and on the consequences of discretionary deviation.  The closer are the 
adjudicator’s choices to what is socially optimal, and the lesser the social welfare 
consequences of deviation, the more likely it is that allowing discretion will be desirable, 
that is, superior to use of the best definite rule. 
  The lessons from this simple analysis of the situation where there are just two 
values of the unincluded variable carry over in straightforward  ways to more general 
situations with multiple included variables and with each having possibly many possible 
values, not just two.  The general manner in which the analysis of discretion would be 
undertaken is essentially the same.   Namely, find the best definite rule by specifying the 
decision for which the expected value of welfare is maximized (computed with regard to 
all the possible values of unincluded variables and their probabilities).  Then determine, 
for any particular rule allowing discretion (I considered only the rule allowing complete 
discretion above) what the adjudicators would do in reaction to the various possible 
values of the unincluded variables, so that expected welfare can be ascertained.  Then 
compare these expected values to decide whether discretion is desirable to allow and, in 
general, how much to allow (when I discuss the scope of discretion below, I will be 




                                                                                                                                                 
formal analysis in section 3, however, I am explicit about the adjudicator’s preferences and I explain his 
choices as those that best foster his underlying preferences.]  
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reviewing authorities 
It is helpful to expand the basic model so as to justify, within the model, how the 
adjudicators are made to obey the rules that they are supposed to apply.  Because it has 
been assumed that adjudicators have their own goals, it needs to be stated why the 
adjudicators would obey the rules in so far as the rules depend on what has been termed 
included variables (such as whether a criminal defendant committed theft).   The 
adjudicator might not want to make a decision within the bounds that a rule calls for.   
In answer, it will be assumed that there is a reviewing authority that can observe 
the included variables and also an adjudicator’s decision itself.  If the adjudicator’s 
decision is in conflict with what the rule requires, it will supposed that the decision is not 
permitted. 
The reviewing authority is thus effectively presumed to carry out the wishes of 
society or other organizational entity.  Later, I will comment on relaxation of this 
assumption in several ways: we might assume that oversight by the reviewing authority is 
is costly, perhaps is random (the case of monitoring), perhaps is undertaken only at the 
behest of a litigant (the appeals process), and perhaps is imperfect.  The latter possibility 
arises because the reviewing authority’s information may not be accurate and because the 
authority may itself be subject to the problem of discretionary deviation.  For now, 
however, I ignore these complexities and assume the reviewing authority perfectly 
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rationale for the desirability of discretion 
The possible advantage of permitting discretion inheres in the assumption that 
there are certain variables, like demeanor, that are excluded from the rule that 
adjudicators must apply, so that the only way that these variables can be reflected in 
decisions is by granting adjudicators the discretion they need to take the unincluded 
variables into account.  It is thus natural to ask what the basis is for the assumption that 
there are excluded variables, and it is of interest also to inquire about the types of 
variables that will tend to be excluded.  As mentioned in the introduction, there are two 
major explanations for the exclusion of variables from rules. 
First, the reviewing authority may not be able to observe and thus to verify certain 
variables.  For instance, the reviewing authority might not be able to verify the demeanor 
of a criminal defendant.  The reasons why verification may be difficult have to do with 
cost and practicality.  To judge demeanor, a reviewing court might have to do such things 
as make sure that there is a videorecording of the defendant’s testimony (and perhaps 
more, of how he behaved in the courtroom when he was not testifying) and would have to 
spend the time to view it.  That would be expensive, especially in comparison to, for 
instance, merely reading that the defendant had been found to be of a certain age and to 
have stolen a certain amount; such facts as these could be attested to by a reliable party 
and quickly absorbed.  Hence, it may be that, due to low cost of verification, it makes 
sense to treat such variables as age and amount stolen as included variables and owing to 
high costs of verification to treat variables like demeanor as excluded variables. 
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authority helps to determine whether a variable may be included in a rule, one may ask 
about the social desirability of the system spending sufficiently to convert an unincluded 
variable into an included one.   If demeanor is an excluded variable, but could be 
converted into an included variable by spending enough so that the reviewing authority 
could verify the defendant’s demeanor, should this be done?  The answer depends on the 
degree to which allowing discretion already improves social welfare.  If permitting 
discretion leads to a good enough level of social welfare, it will not be worthwhile 
spending enough to make demeanor an included variable.  If discretion would not be 
worthwhile granting because adjudicators would often not take proper account of the 
excluded variable, then it might be desirable for the system to spend to convert that 
variable into an included one.   In principle, then, a complete analysis of discretion would 
build into it the optimal decision about whether to make a variable included or not. 
Second, a variable may not be included in a rule for a wholly different reason, and 
regardless therefore of whether the reviewing authority can verify it.  Namely, the 
framers of the rule may not have had the time or imagination to foresee the relevance of 
the particular realization of a variable.   An example is that mentioned in the 
introduction: If those charged with making traffic laws passed a rule limiting a person’s 
speed to 65 m.p.h. except in an “emergency,” how well, if at all, would they have defined 
“emergency”?  Obviously, they would not, and could not, think of all possible 
emergencies that might excuse traveling at more than 65 m.p.h.  Suppose that a blind 
person’s seeing-eye dog has had an accident and needs to be taken with great speed to the 
veterinary hospital in order to save its life.  This event might qualify as an emergency for 
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unlikely to have come into the contemplation of the framers of the traffic ordinance.  
Such an explanation for the absence of certain variables in rules is independent of the 
issue of the reviewing authority’s ability to verify a variable – there would be no 
necessary problem faced by a reviewing authority in determining whether a dog was a 
seeing-eye dog or whether it needed emergency veterinary treatment. 
Again, it may be mentioned that the issue of cost is involved in the preceding 
paragraph, for if the framers spend more time on formulating a rule, they can include 
more variables in its description (assuming that the variables would be verifiable by the 
reviewing authority).  And again, this choice of the framers could be built into the 
analysis of discretion.
8
Another point should be added, concerning a peculiar difficulty afflicting those 
who formulate rules.  The difficulty is not that there is a problem in foreseeing the 
possible values of a relevant variable.  Rather the difficulty is sheer inability to describe 
the values of the variable.  Consider again the demeanor of a criminal defendant (and for 
present purposes, suppose that there is no issue of the reviewing authority’s being unable 
to observe demeanor – let us say that it looks at a perfect videotape).  How, exactly, can 
“demeanor” be described so that it serves well enough for a workable rule, a rule that 
adjudicators can follow and that a reviewing authority can apply?  It appears to me that 
we do not have words in our language that would allow us to delineate a remorseful 
                                                 
8 [Kaplow (1992) considers the question whether the framers of a rule should make a law more 
detailed but is concerned with issues distinct from discretion and the behavior of adjudicators.  In his 
analysis, the advantage of a more detailed rule is that the addressees of the rule can better conform their 
behavior to the rule.  If the details of the rule are likely to be of use to enough of these individuals, then it 
may be economical for the framers to refine the rule; but if the usefulness of the rule would be rare, then it 
would not be desirable for the framers to refine the rule.]  
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressdemeanor in even passingly specific terms.  Whether a person’s demeanor is remorseful 
would be determined by a compound of such characterisitcs as the timbre of a person’s 
voice, his facial expressions, his body language, and the like, yet we can not use our 
language to describe these characteristics in a very precise way.  This problem seems to 
pose special difficulties for the articulation of rules.  Observe, however, that the inability 
of the framers of rules to describe a variable like demeanor does not mean that they 
cannot reason in regard to it.
9  They might well have confidence that adjudicators could 
recognize and would treat in more or less the socially desired way a defendant’s 
demeanor in their decisions; this could influence the framers to grant discretion to 
adjudicators. 
To summarize, the explanations advanced in this section for why certain variables 
will not be included in rules underly the possible desirability of according discretion to 
adjudicators; for only through granting discretion to adjudicators can these excluded 
variables be taken into account in the making of decisions.   
E.  Discussion of the foregoing  
  Before continuing with analysis of ways that the problem of discretionary 
deviation can be ameliorated and controlled, it is worthwhile amplifying what has been 
said in a number of ways. 
 (1)    The force of the explanation for the desirability of allowing discretion.  It 
appears to me that the fact that we observe the granting of discretion as a more or less 
                                                 
9 [In a formal sense, I am suggesting that the framers, the overseeing entity, can express at least 
symbolically the set of possible realizations of a variable (such as the set of possible demeanors a person 
could display) and compute an expected value with regard to it, even though being unable to express it in 
English...] 
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contours of the simple theory presented here.   
On one hand, the reasons just offered in section D for the exclusion of variables 
from rules suggest that there is a truly enormous range of factors that cannot be included 
in rules but that are nevertheless relevant to the decisions that we would like to be made.  
The amount of information to which adjudicators but not reviewing authorities are privy 
is great.  In our legal system, this information comprises testimony, pleadings, the whole 
of what trial courts experience; it is difficult on grounds of cost and practicality for 
reviewing courts to observe very much of this, so that it is rendered effectively 
unreviewable.  Also, it is manifest that framers of rules promulgate only quite general 
rules and do not nearly have the time to reflect on this or that circumstance that might 
have been explicitly mentioned.  It is also evident that a great deal of this information is 
relevant to decisions so we would like it to be taken into account.  Hence, there is 
substantial potential value in allowing discretion. 
On the other hand, the granting of discretion I would surmise allows a great deal 
of the information that is excluded from rules to be employed by those with discretion in 
a tolerably good way.  Adjudicators often (not always; see (2) below) have relatively 
little personal interest in making decisions that deviate greatly from social or 
organizational goals (in part because they tend to be selected for this trait).  Additionally, 
as will be discussed, there are a variety of tools that can be employed to cabin 
discretionary deviation, limiting its importance.  
Hence, it is not surprising that we observe the general granting of discretion.  This 
is not to say, of course, that the degree of discretion is optimal.  Rather, the claim is that 
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undesirable.    
 (2)  Types and sources  of discretionary deviation.  Little has been said to this 
point about why adjudicators might make decisions that do not advance social or 
organizational welfare, and a number of reasons should be mentioned.  The view taken 
here of adjudicators is that they are individuals with preferences that have the general 
character of those of all individuals, namely, they care about their own interests in the 
conventional sense (personal consumption, and the like) as well as the well-being of 
others, including of society as a whole.    
From this perspective, one reason that an adjudicator might exercise discretion in 
a way that departs from society’s desires that they differ in the social goals that they want 
to promote.  In other words, in so far as their utility depends on society’s situation and 
they can affect it, they might want to make a decision that departs from society’s 
preferred one. 
Second, adjudicators might deviate from society’s wishes in their use of discretion 
because they do not understand what will advance social welfare.  That is, adjudicators 
might make the wrong decision not because they disagree about the social objective but 
rather because they lack information relevant to what would foster the social objective. 
Third, adjudicators might make decisions that deviate from the socially best ones 
because of corruption of some type, that is, an adjudicator’s personal interest might be 
furthered by his deviation.  Notably, the adjudicator might receive a bribe for favoring an 
individual or might be threatened with harm if he does not do that.    
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  We now begin our discussion of the ways in which the disadvantages of allowing 
discretion can be curbed, thus raising its usefulness in an overall sense.  The most direct 
fashion in which this can be done is by limiting the scope of discretionary authority.  
Recall that a general rule is assumed to specify the set or scope (the two words are used 
synonymously here) of permissible decisions that the adjudicator may make, given the 
included variable.   In principle, the question can be asked of any possible decision that 
might be included within the scope of permissible decisions, would it or would it not be 
desirable to exclude this decision from the scope of permissible decisions?  That is, if the 
decision is excluded from the permissible set of decisions, what would adjudicators do 
and would we expect welfare to rise or not?  A necessary condition for the scope of 
discretion to be optimally chosen is that if any possible decision is removed from the 
scope of discretion, expected social welfare would fall as a consequence; conversely, if 
the removal of a decision from the scope of discretion would raise expected social 
welfare, the decision should be excluded from the set of permissible decisions.  
When would it be supposed that removal of a decision from the scope of 
discretionary choice is desirable?  One general factor is the likelihood that the decision 
would be desirable and the importance of this.  If a long sentence for theft, such as 10 
years, would be very unlikely to be desirable given the distribution of the unincluded 
variables, and if a somewhat lesser sentence would function fairly well even when 10 
years would be best, then excluding such a long sentence as 10 years from the scope of 
discretion might be advisable.  Another general factor is the probability that an 
adjudicator would choose the decision when it is undesirable to do so and the importance 
  21
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressof that.  If some adjudicators would be likely to choose long sentences, perhaps because 
they mistakenly believe that they will increase deterrence of theft, then that would 
suggest that long sentences might well be excluded from the scope of discretion.  If it is 
unlikely that adjudicators would ever impose a long sentence except when needed, then 
even though such a sentence would be unlikely to be desirable, it might be best to leave it 
within the scope of discretion.  These two general factors then may be implicitly regarded 
as important determinants of the optimal scope of discretion. 
An inherent limitation in society’s ability to usefully control discretion through 
restriction of its scope exists, however.  Namely, and as noted in the introduction, this 
cannot prevent discretionary deviation within the scope of discretion (among sentences 
that are permitted), and also it cannot allow any discretion once it results in exclusion of a 
possible decision from the permitted scope.  Hence, limitation of the scope of discretion 
is, although powerful, a crude instrument for controlling discretion. 
G.  Control of discretion through standards 
A different method of controlling discretion is through standards.  By a standard I 
mean a statement, principle, or policy that is intended to guide discretion but that does 
not constitute a rule.   
To clarify the definition of a standard, consider the example that I mentioned of a 
statement in a traffic law that an emergency would excuse a person from having violated 
the speed limit by going at over 65 m.p.h.  To elaborate why this law involves a standard 
in terms of the vocabulary and definitions of the model, assume that the included variable 
is speed and that unincluded variables are such factors as whether the driver was 
transporting an injured person or animal in pressing need of help.  Assume also that these 
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decisions be fines between $0 and $500.  Suppose that the law reads: “A fine of between 
$100 and $500 may be imposed for going over 65 m.p.h. unless there is an emergency, in 
which case a lower fine, or no fine, is to be imposed.”  This is a general rule that formally 
allows complete scope of discretion – any fine between $0 and $500 – when the included 
variable, speed, exceeds 65 m.p.h.  The part of the statement of the law that if there was 
an emergency, a lower fine than $100, or no fine at all, may be regarded as follows.  It 
suggests but does not necessarily dictate when the adjudicator can impose fines less than 
$100.  That is, I assume that the word “emergency” does not have a clear meaning with 
respect to all the possible values of the unincluded variables.  If the meaning of 
emergency were unambiguous, that is, if every set of circumstances could be said to be an 
emergency or not to be, then we would know for sure how to classify cases into 
emergencies, so would call the variables describing the case included variables and the 
law in question would be what I have called a general rule (with the scope of discretion 
being $100 to $500 in the absence of emergency and $0 to $100 given an emergency).  
That the word “emergency” does not necessarily (or ever) have a clear meaning is the key 
element of the definition of standard.  When the adjudicator applies his interpretation of 
the word emergency, I assume this will be, or may be, reconsidered by the reviewing 
authority.  I consider what the adjudicator decides, and what the reviewing authority 
decides, concerning whether an emergency is found as both potentially probabilistic.  By 
contrast, I have been assuming that decisions of a reviewing authority are not 
probabilistic if there is a general rule (either the decision falls within the scope of 
discretion given the included variables or it does not – there is no ambiguity about this).  
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not a certain, meaning to the scope of discretion given the included variable.   
Why a standard may be socially desirable to employ may be seen by comparing 
the situation with a standard to that without.  If there is no standard, then the adjudicator 
has complete freedom to choose within the scope of discretion.  In the example, if the 
rule were that when the speed exceeded 65 m.p.h., a fine between $0 and $500 should be 
imposed, then the adjudicator would be free to choose anything.  With a standard, the 
framers have the opportunity to accomplish part of what they would if they had the time 
to formulate a more detailed rule.  For if the standard, although probabilistic in how it 
affects adjudicators’ decisions and the reviewing authority’s oversight of them, reflects 
what would have been set out in a more detailed rule, it will enhance welfare.  In the 
example, if the word “emergency” captures what the framers would have said, had they 
had more time to do so, about conditions that should result in a lower fine, then the 
standard may well improve welfare.   However, for the reviewing authority to be able to 
enforce the standard, the variables to which the standard refers must be observable by the 
reviewing authority.
10    
It should be noted that a standard may improve discretionary decisions just 
because it prevents, probabilistically, adjudicators from substituting their preferences for 
society’s.   Standards may also inform an adjudicator who is uncertain about society’s 
interests of what is really in its interest.   For instance, a standard that says that when 
                                                 
10 [A statement in a law that is purely aspirational because it is based on a variable that is not 
observable by the tribunal I do not term a standard.  For instance, if a law said that a person’s degree of 
remorse should influence the sentence (setting aside the difficulty in defining remorse) would be 
aspirational if the reviewing court could not observe remorse.  Some might call a purely aspirational 
statement a standard; and such a statement might have a beneficial aspect because it might supply useful 
information to an adjudicator (one of the reasons that I say (see below) that standards are helpful.] 
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the adjudicator that the framers have decided that fault rather than strict liability has been 
found to be useful on policy grounds.     
The importance of standards appears to be great, standards seem to be a primary if 
not ubiquitous means of controlling discretion.  On reflection, laws include many features 
that are best regarded as standards, since so often we find language reflecting 
reasonableness, balancing tests phrased in general terms, and the like.   The explanation 
for the broad use of standards is that it is so often true that framers cannot practically 
refine the rules they formulate, but what they can do is announce standards based on 
observables to the reviewing authority that function in a probabilistic but helpful way to 
influence the use of discretion by adjudicators.   
H.  Control of discretion through decision-based incentives 
  Let us next consider an indirect means of influencing discretionary deviation, by 
means of altering the incentives of adjudicators.  For example, if adjudicators tend to 
impose sentences that are more lenient than society desires, then they could be given 
some sort of incentive that would lead them to reduce sentences.  The incentive could 
take the form of enhanced promotion possibilities if sentences are not too low, or 
admonition or extra duties if sentences are too low, or salary could be made to depend on 
statistics regarding sentencing.  While explicit linking of incentives to decisions might 
seem out of keeping with the supposed role of adjudicators (judges are supposed to be 
naturally just), the incentives can be implicit.  In any case, the point remains that 
incentives can in principle be devised, and the question to be considered here is how well 
they can function to correct the problem of discretionary deviation. 
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decisions – sentence length – not on the unincluded variable, such as degree of remorse.  
That incentives are assumed not to depend on unincluded variables is justified by the 
assumptions explaining why unincluded variables are unincluded in the rules adjudicators 
apply.  It would be manifestly inconsistent to allow adjudicators’ incentives to be based 
on unincluded variables when the rules that they apply cannot be based on those 
variables.
11   
  To what degree can decision-based incentives, if well designed, correct 
discretionary deviation?  In certain special cases, discretionary deviation can be 
eliminated through a decision-based incentive based scheme.  Suppose, for example, that 
discretionary deviation does not depend on unincluded variables.  For instance, suppose 
that the sentence will be a half year year too low, regardless of the unincluded variable, 
such as the degree of remorse.  Then this across-the-board deviation could often be 
corrected by an incentive scheme that suitably rewards sentences if they are raised by a 
half year.   
In general, however, decision-based incentives only partially correct discretionary 
deviation.  One reason concerns heterogeneity among adjudicators; the need to alter 
incentives will vary among adjudicators, and the influence of an incentive will also vary 
among them.  Another difficulty with decision-based incentives is that the problem of 
discretionary deviation will often depend on the unincluded variable.  Suppose that the 
adjudicator would choose a sentence that is a half year too low if remorse is shown, but a 
socially desirable sentence if no remorse is shown; the discretionary deviation is different 
                                                 
11 [It is also assumed that the incentives for adjudicators cannot be based on the social welfare 
consequences of their decisions, for instance, the effect on social welfare of imposing a particular sentence 
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corrected perfectly, since the decision-based incentive cannot be modified when remorse 
is shown.  In particular, if the incentive leads adjudicators to increase sentences by some 
amount, that will help when remorse is shown and the sentence is lenient, but it will hurt 
when remorse is not shown and the sentence is correct.   
Realistically, one would expect that heterogeneity among adjudicators and the 
dependence of discretionary deviation on unincluded variables to be important.  Hence, 
decision-based incentive schemes can help, but will not cure, problems of discretionary 
deviation.  In the formal analysis, it is proved that under very broad conditions, incentive 
schemes are useful but that they cannot eliminate the problem of discretionary deviation.   
I. Control of discretion through monitoring    
Another approach to the control of discretion is through probabilistic monitoring 
of adjudicators.  For instance, we might imagine that a reviewing authority visits a 
courtroom to witness proceedings or at least reads a trial transcript.  Assuming that a 
reviewing authority can ascertain the normally unincluded variable through such 
monitoring, the authority might be able to determine whether there was discretionary 
deviation and penalize it.  If the expected penalty for discretionary deviation is sufficient, 
that is, if the probability of monitoring and the penalty that would follow from deviation 
is high enough, then adjudicators can be induced to exercise discretion in the socially 
appropriate manner. 
In considering the effectiveness of this method of control of deviation, two 
important factors should be taken into account.  First, monitoring is costly, meaning that 
raising the likelihood monitoring to the level at which it would be effective in inducing 
                                                                                                                                                 
on a criminal.  This assumption is discussed in section 3C below. ] 
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penalty for improper decisions governs how high the probability of monitoring must be to 
be effective; the more constrained the penalty, the greater must be the probability of 
monitoring.   
Additionally, various problems attend monitoring itself.  Not only may 
monitoring be inaccurate, but also questions arise concerning the motivation of the 
reviewing authority.  If a reviewing authority observes discretionary deviation, why 
would he correctly report this?  He would only do so if his objectives are society’s, 
different from the adjudicator’s.  It is true that a reviewing authority might be selected on 
a more rigorous basis than adjudicators and that other mechanisms might be employed to 
align his incentives with society’s but the problem at issue remains a real one. 
Another difficulty concerns the ability of a reviewing authority to define 
discretionary deviation.  This arises in situations where the reason that a variable is 
unincluded is that the framers of a rule did not foresee it, as exemplified by the example 
of the seeing-eye dog who needs emergency treatment.   Although standards may be of 
aid in such situations (see section 3E), frequently it will not be self-evident what 
constitutes discretionary deviation.   
J. Control of discretion through the appeals process 
An additional approach to ameliorating problems with discretion is the appeals 
process, by which is meant a procedure under which disappointed litigants can have the 
decision of the adjudicator reconsidered by a reviewing authority.  The appeals process 
resembles monitoring, as just described, but with the significant difference that 
reconsideration of an adjudicator’s decision is triggered by litigants rather than being 
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the assumption that litigants are able to spot discretionary deviation and would then tend 
to bring appeals.   
To amplify, suppose initially that litigants are able to recognize when decisions 
are not socially optimal and that the reviewing authority can ascertain when there has 
been discretionary deviation and will correct it.  Under these assumptions, discretionary 
deviation will result in an appeal and will be corrected when the harm to a litigant caused 
by deviation exceeds the cost of an appeal.  Anticipating that their deviations will result 
in appeals if their deviations are sufficiently large, adjudicators will be induced not to 
deviate in such a way that would lead to an appeal.
12  Notice, then, that no appeals will 
actually be made.  Hence, one can see the advantage of the appeals process over 
monitoring, for monitoring must actually occur, involving expense, to induce 
adjudicators not to deviate.
13
It follows as well from the foregoing logic that it would be desirable for the state 
to subsidize appeals, making them free to bring.  In this way, adjudicators would be 
induced to decide all cases correctly, since if appeals were costless to bring, any 
discretionary deviation would result in an appeal.  This would not actually be costly for 
society, since, again, no appeals would turn out to be brought. 
                                                 
12 [In strict logic, an adjudicator will be indifferent between deviating and not if all that will 
happen is that deviation is corrected and he is not penalized.  However, any kind of penalty will lead him 
not to want to deviate.  The penalty could be reputational, or it could be part of his reward structure, 
including reduced promotion possibilities or salary.] 
 
13 [A qualification to this point is that, under monitoring, all discretionary deviation is corrected, 
whereas under the appeals process, only discretionary deviation over the threshold that would result in 
appeal is corrected.  This difference, though, disappears when appeal is subsidized; see the next paragraph.] 
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be brought, depends on the assumption that litigants and the appeals authority do not 
make errors.  If the appeals process is not completely accurate (for instance, might result 
in reversal of a correct decision), or if adjudicators do not know precisely when litigants 
would make appeals (because for instance they do not know the true cost of an appeal to 
a litigant), then appeals will sometimes be brought.  Nevertheless, the thrust of the 
conclusions described above would still hold, that the appeals approach is economical 
relative to monitoring. 
Another feature of the appeals process as just described that bears comment is that 
any discretionary deviation sufficiently large would be appealed.  This would not be true 
in contexts where there is only one party before the adjudicator, such as an applicant to a 
college or a person asking for a decision about benefits from an administrative judge at 
the Social Security Administration.  In these contexts, since there is only one litigant who 
would bring an appeal, and he would appeal only deviations that go against him, the 
appeals process would not correct deviations in his favor, no matter how substantial. 
Additionally, the discussion of the appeals process presumed that the reviewing 
authority could determine whether discretionary deviation occurred, implying that it 
could ascertain the unincluded variables.  If the reviewing authority examines a decision 
after the adjudicator has made it, this might not be possible or might be very expensive to 
achieve.  Where, however, the reason for exclusion of a variable from the rule is lack of 
foresight of the framers, then the reviewing authority does not face a problem of 
verification; but it does face the problem of defining what constitutes devation, as was 
noted in relation to monitoring.  
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The various methods of control of discretion were all seen to be imperfect, but in 
different ways, and I remark here on how they compare to each other.  As was indicated 
at the outset, limiting the scope of discretion is a blunt way of controlling discretion, but 
it has the advantage that it should be fairly cheap to implement (presuming that the 
expense of determining the boundaries of the allowed scope is low).  [Standards...to be 
completed.] 
The use of decision-based incentives, such as rewarding judges on the basis of the 
average length of prison sentences imposed, has utility over limiting the scope of 
discretion, especially because it influences how adjudicators exercise discretion within 
the scope of discretion.  Moreover, it should be relatively economical, as it does not 
require oversight of actual decisions, as does monitoring and the appeals process.  Still, 
decision-based incentives are imperfect because they cannot address variation in the 
propensity to deviate among adjudicators nor can they be calibrated to reflect the 
unincluded variables to which adjudicators may react.   
Monitoring and the appeals process should tend to be more expensive than 
decision-based incentives, because these two methods of control require reconsideration 
of individual cases.  The appeals process holds an advantage over monitoring, in that the 
appeals process is triggered by litigants and thus is able to harness information that they 
have about discretionary deviation.  In particular, this implies that the appeals process 
may be more economical than monitoring, for the threat of appeal means that it may 
reduce deviations without actually having to occur very often.  However, the appeals 
process is not necessarily superior to monitoring, one reason being that certain types of 
  31
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressdeviation tend not to be appealed.  Moreover, both monitoring and the appeals process 
encounter difficulties concerning accuracy and also the motivations of the reviewing 
authorities themselves.  
L.  Related literature 
 
  [To be completed.]    
3. Formal Analysis 
  I consider here a simple model of the discretion of an adjudicator (a more general 
model is sketched in section G below).   Assume that there is a variable y (such as the 
degree of remorse) that is not included in a rule that an adjudicator is to apply, and that 
this unincluded variable takes on two possible values, y1 < y2, where q is the probability 
of y1 and (1 – q) that of y2.
14  Let d be the decision of the adjudicator (such as the length 
of a sentence).  (This variable is called the decision even though it might not be chosen 
by the adjudicator but rather prescribed.)  The variables y and d are assumed to be real 
numbers.  Further, let u(y, d) be the utility of the adjudicator, where u is a continuous 
function of y and d and is concave in d.
15  Similarly, let w(y, d) be social welfare, where 
w is a continuous function of y and d and concave in d.
16   
                                                 
14 [A more general version of the formal analysis, with y being continuously variable, is developed 
in a separate article on which I am working.] 
 
15 [Of course, the utility will also depend on the included variable, such as the crime that a person 
committed. but this is suppressed in the notation...so u(y, d) is the utility of the adjudicator for a person who 
committed a particular crime (like theft) as a function of an unincluded variable (like demeanor) and the 
decision (the sentence length).  a similar comment applies to social welfare, about to be mentioned.] 
 




http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art50Let d*(yi) be the socially optimal choice of d given yi: d*(yi) maximizes w(yi, d) 
over d.  Assume also that d*(y1) < d*(y2).
17     
A.  Possible desirability of discretion    
If the adjudicator is able to choose his decision, that is, enjoys discretion, he will 
select d to maximize u(y, d), and thus his choice will generally depend on yi; let d(yi) 
denote his decision as a function of yi.
18  Social welfare given discretion is thus 
(1)       WD  =  qw(y1, d(y1)) + (1 – q)w(y2, d(y2)). 
If the adjudicator does not have discretion and his decision is thus a prescribed 
d,
19 social welfare is 
(2)   WND(d) = qw(y1, d) + (1 – q)w(y2, d). 
The decision that would be stipulated in the rule in the absence of discretion is that which 
maximizes (2); denote that decision by d*.   Hence, if there is no discretion, social 
welfare is 
(3)       WND(d*) = qw(y1, d*) + (1 – q)w(y2, d*). 
Note that WND(d*)  must be less than first-best social welfare, which is 
(4)       W* = qw(y1, d*(y1)) + (1 – q)w(y2, d*(y2)), 
since d*(y1) < d*(y2). 
  Discretion is superior to no discretion if WD > WND(d*), or if 
(5)   q[w(y1, d(y1)) – w(y1, d*)] + (1 – q)[w(y2, d(y2)) – w(y2, d*)]; 
                                                 
17 The case where d*(yi) does not depend on yi is not of interest; and the assumption that d*(y1) < 
d*(y2) rather than the reverse is inessential.   
 
18 [By discretion is meant complete discretion.  Limiting the scope of discretion will be discussed 
in a later section.] 
  
19 The adjudicator still has something to do, to verify the values of included variables, such as that 
a particular crime occurred.  
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welfare under discretion and under the fixed decision d* is positive. 
  A simple sufficient condition may be given for discretion to be desirable.  Define 
d(yi) – d*(yi) to be the discretionary deviation given yi.  Then if the maximum 
discretionary deviation is sufficiently small in absolute value, discretion is desirable.  
This follows because WD tends to W* as the maximum of the absolute value of the 
discretionary deviation tends to 0, whereas WND does not depend on the utility function u 
and is bounded below W*. 
  A simple sufficient condition may also be given for discretion not to be desirable.  
Suppose that discretionary deviation is positive for each yi.  Then if q is sufficiently close 
to 0 or to 1 (that is, uncertainty is sufficiently small), discretion.  This follows because, as 
q tends to 0 or to 1, WND(d*) tends to W*, whereas WD does not tend to W*. 
  We may summarize as follows. 
PROPOSITION 1.  Discretion is desirable when (5) holds.  A sufficient condition for 
discretion to be desirable is that the maximum discretionary deviation is small enough in 
absolute value.  A sufficient condition for discretion not to be desirable is that 
discretionary deviation is positive and that the uncertainty about the unincluded variable 
is small enough (q is sufficiently small or large). 
  An example illustrates the foregoing.  Suppose that w(d, y) =  – (d – y)
2 and that 
u(d, y) =   – (d – ky)
2.  Hence, d*(y) = y and d(y) = ky, so that if k < 1, discretionary 
deviation is negative, if k = 0 there is no discretionary deviation, and if k > 1, 
discretionary deviation is positive.  Also, W* = 0 and WD = – (1 – k)
2(qy1
2 + (1 – q)y2
2); 
thus note that WD = 0 if k = 1.  Also (2) is – [q(d – y1)
2 + (1 – q)(d – y2)
2], so that d* = qy1 
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2.  Discretion is best when WD – WND(d*) > 
0, or when  q(1 – q)(y1 – y2)
2 – (1 – k)
2(qy1
2 + (1 – q)y2
2) > 0.  The latter expression, note, 
must be positive if k is sufficiently close to 1 and must be negative if q is small enough or 
close enough to 1, consistent with Proposition 1. 
B.  Control of discretion through limitation of its scope 
  For simplicity, the comparison that has been considered is between not allowing 
discretion and allowing complete discretion.  But adjudicators’ set of permissible 
decisions may be limited in scope.  This would generally allow an improvement over 
complete discretion.   
In fact, limiting the scope of discretion can always improve welfare when 
allowing unlimited discretion is superior to no discretion but is not first-best, that is, there 
is some discretionary deviation.  To show this, observe that if unlimited discretion is 
desirable, then it must be that d(y1) is not equal to d(y2): otherwise the common d could 
not be superior to use of d*, so that no discretion would be at least as good as allowing 
discretion.   Also, since a hypothesis is that a first-best outcome is not achieved, it must 
be that either d(y1) or d(y2) is not first-best, and let us assume d(y1) is not first best and 
exceeds d*(y1) (the other cases are essentially the same).  Then because w is concave in d, 
a slight decrease in d(y1) must increase welfare w.   Now suppose that the scope of 
discretion is limited to d(y1) - , and d(y2), where , is small.  It is clear that the adjudicator 
would choose d(y1) - , rather than d(y2) for , sufficiently small: since d(y1) is not equal to 
d(y2), it must be that u(y1, d(y1)) > u(y1, d(y2)), implying that for , small enough, u(y1, 
d(y1) - ,) > u(y1, d(y2)) by continuity of u.  Also, the adjudicator will clearly choose d(y2) 
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occurs, so expected welfare increases.  We thus have  
PROPOSITION 2.  Limiting the scope of discretion is desirable whenever unlimited 
discretion would be desirable but there is still some discretionary deviation. 
It should be noted as well that the first-best outcome can be obtained by limiting 
the set of possible decisions to d*(y1) and d*(y2), if u(y1, d*(y1)) > u(y1, d*(y2)) and that 
u(y2, d*(y2)) > u(y2, d*(y1)).    
  Of course, in a model in which there are a continuum of y rather than just two 
values, it would be natural to consider limiting the scope of liability to intervals, rather 
than, as here, to two values. 
[Control of discretion through use of standards] 
C.  Control of discretion through decision-based incentives    
  The adjudicator may be given a decision-based incentive r = r(d), so that he will 
choose his decision d to maximize u(y, d) +  r(d) rather than to maximize u(y, d).  It is 
assumed that although the incentive r is a function of d, that r cannot be a function of the 
unincluded variable y or of social welfare w.  That r may depend on d is justified by the 
fact that the decision is observable by a reviewing authority (see section 2C).  That r 
cannot depend on y is justified by the assumptions that explain why y is not included in 
the rule itself, namely, either that y is not observable by the reviewing authority or that it 
was not feasible to include the variable in the rule.  That r cannot depend on w is justified 
when society (or an organization) cannot observe the welfare consequence of a decision 
in a direct way (such as that of sentencing a prisoner).
20  
                                                 
20 The social welfare consequences w(y, d) of sentencing a criminal to a term of d years who had 
showed a particular degree of remorse y would be refected in such outcomes as the following: whether the 
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problem of discretionary deviation can be ameliorated when the adjudicator maximizes 
u(y, d) + r(d) instead of u(y, d). 
First, observe that, if u(y, d) differs from w(y, d) by a function of d alone, then the 
first-best outcome can be obtained using an appropriate r(d).  In particular, since the 
hypothesis is that u(y, d) – w(y, d)  = b(d) for some function b(d), then w(y, d) = u(y, d) – 
b(d).  Accordingly, if r(d) =  – b(d), the adjudicator will maximize u(y, d) + r(d) = w(y, 
d), so there will be no discretionary deviation.  
Second, when u(y, d) does not bear any necessary relationship to w(y, d), the first-
best outcome generally cannot be obtained.  To prove this, assume otherwise, that the 
first-best outcome can be obtained.  Then, since when y1 occurs, d*(y1) is chosen, we 
must have u(y1, d*(y1)) +  r(d*(y1)) $  u(y1, d*(y2)) +  r(d*(y2)).  Hence,  
(6)   r(d*(y2)) – r(d*(y1)) # u(y1, d*(y1)) – u(y1, d*(y2)). 
Now suppose that u(y, d) is such that u(y2, d*(y1)) – u(y2, d*(y2)) > u(y1, d*(y1))  – u(y1, 
d*(y2)).  Then by (6)   
(7)   u(y2, d*(y1)) – u(y2, d*(y2)) > r(d*(y2)) – r(d*(y1)). 
This, however, implies that u(y2, d*(y1)) + r(d*(y1)) > u(y2, d*(y2)) + r(d*(y2)), which is 
to say that d*(y1) would be chosen over d*(y2) when y2 occurs.  Therefore, the first-best 
outcome cannot generally be obtained. 
                                                                                                                                                 
criminal would commit more crimes on release, whether the victim felt assuaged by the criminal’s 
statement and behavior in court, and whether friends of the criminal feel the sentence was appropriate.  
These outcomes would be difficult for society to observe and to use as a basis for rewarding or penalizing a 
judge (in part because they might take years to eventuate).  Similarly, the effect on the welfare of a college 
of a decision whether or not to admit an applicant with unincluded characteristics y (how he presented 
himself in an interview) would not be directly and immediately observable to college administrators, for the 
effect would have to do with what the school lost if it did not admit the applicant and with what it would 
gain over the person’s future at the school and afterwards; hence for a college to give its admissions 
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deviation, then use of an incentive r(d) raises social welfare.  To show this, recall from 
the last section that d(y1) must be unequal to d(y2).  Suppose that the discretionary 
deviation is such that d(y1) < d*(y1)  (the other cases are essentially identical), so that 
welfare will rise if d(y1) were to be slightly increased.  Now consider the function r(d) 
defined as follows: r(d) is 0 except that in an interval [d(y1) + 0/2, d(y1) + 0], r(d) = * for 
a small positive 0 and *.  It is clear that, for any * > 0, the d that maximizes u(y1, d) + 
r(d) will be in the interval [d(y1) + 0/2, d(y1) + 0] if we choose 0 small enough, for u is 
continuous and d(y1) maximizes u(y1, d) over d.  Also, it is evident that if 0 and * are 
sufficiently small, u(y2, d) + r(d) is maximized over d at d(y2), since u is continuous.  In 
other words, for properly chosen small 0 and *, the function u(y1, d) + r(d) is maximized 
at a d slightly higher than d(y1) and that u(y2) + r(d) is maximized at d(y2), implying that 
w(y1, d) rises and w(y2, d) is the same, so that expected social welfare rises.  Thus, there 
exists an r(d) that improves social welfare when there is discretionary deviation, given 
the assumed condition.  
  The points made are summarized as follows. 
PROPOSITION 3. Use of the optimal decision-based incentive r = r(d) leads adjudicators to 
choose first-best outcomes if their utility u(y, d) differs from social welfare w(y, d) by a 
function of d alone; otherwise first-best adjudicator behavior cannot generally be 
achieved.  However, decision-based incentives can improve social welfare whenever 
allowing discretion would be desirable but would result in discretionary deviation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
officers a reward or penalty based on the welfare effects on the college of its admissions decisions would 
be difficult. 
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2, recall that 
d(y) = ky, so that there is discretionary deviation when k is not equal to 1.  Consider 
reward functions of the form r(d) = ad.  Then the adjudicator maximizes – (d – ky)
2 + ad, 
so chooses ky + a/2.  Since w(y, d) = – (d – y)
2, social welfare is – [q(ky1 + a/2 – y1)
2 + (1 
– q)(ky2 + a/2 – y2)
2] =  – [q((k – 1)y1 + a/2)
2 + (1 – q)((k – 1)y2 + a/2)
2].  If this is 
maximized with respect to a, we find that a* = (1 – k)[qy1 + (1 – q)y2].  This makes sense, 
in that the optimal decison-based reward weight a* is opposite in sign to the discretionary 
deviation (the deviation is negative when k < 1, and a* is positive when that is true, and 
conversely) and also reflects the yi’s.  Note too that under a*, the choice of the 
adjudicator differs from the first-best decision under both yi. 
  Several comments should be added.  First, as a general matter if we maximize 
social welfare allowing for adjudication with any discretion-based incentive function 
r(d), we implicitly include consideration of no discretion, limited scope of discretion, and 
complete discretion.  In particular no discretion amounts to use of an r(d) that imposes a 
high penalty for any choice of d unequal to a prescribed decision (such as d*); limiting 
the scope of discretion to a set S of decisions is equivalent to use of an r(d) that imposes a 
high penalty for choosing d outside of S; and complete discretion corresponds to use of 
r(d) equal to a constant.  Second, when the possibility of use of r(d) is taken into account, 
it will be optimal to allow discretion more often than was true in section A, since social 
welfare under discretion will be higher (and a similar remark applies in regard to control 
of discretion through monitoring and the appeals process). 
D.  Control of discretion through monitoring 
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21  Let 
us assume that the decision of an adjudicator is examined (unbeknownst to the 
adjudicator) with probability p, where the monitoring agent observes y, imposes a penalty 
z if the decision is unequal to d*(yi),
22 and reverses any decision that is unequal to d*(yi).  
Thus, the expected utility of an adjudicator who observes yi and does not choose d*(yi) is 
(1 – p)u(yi, d) + pu(yi, d*(yi)) – pz.  It is evident, therefore, that if he does not choose 
d*(yi), he will choose d to maximize u(yi, d), which is to say, d(yi).  If he chooses d*(yi), 
his expected utility will be u(yi, d*(yi)).  Hence, he will choose d*( yi) when  
(8)   (1 – p)[u(yi, d(yi)) – u(yi, d*(yi))] # pz.   
The left side is the expected utility gain from choosing the preferred decision d(yi) rather 
than the socially desirable decision d*(yi), and the right side is the expected penalty.  It 
follows that the minimum p, denoted by pi, needed to induce the choice of d*(yi) is 
determined by 
(9)     (1 – pi)[u(yi, d(yi)) – u(yi, d*(yi))] = piz. 
Note that pi is increasing in the utility gain from the preferred discretionary deviation u(yi, 
d(yi)) – u(yi, d*(yi)) and is decreasing in the penalty z.  Let pM = max(p1,  p2) and pm = 
min(p1,  p2); so if p = pM, there will be no discretionary deviation and if p = pm, there will 
be discretionary deviation under one of the yi  but not under the other (unless p1 = p2, in 
which case pM = pm).  Also, let c(p) be the cost of monitoring with probability p.   
  It is now straightforward to determine when discretion with monitoring is socially 
desirable and what the optimal probability of monitoring is.  Assume for concreteness 
                                                 
21 For simplicity, this issue is analyzed abstracting from decision-based incentives (and likewise 
below, appeals are analyzed abstracting from such incentives and from probabilistic monitoring). 
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p2, so we need only consider these possibilities.  If p = 0, then if there is discretion, social 
welfare is WD.  If p = pm = p1, then social welfare is 
(10)   WD(pm) = qw(y1, d*(y1)) + (1 – q)w(y2, d(y2)) – c(p1),  
in other words, discretionary deviation is eliminated in one circumstance, at a cost of 
c(p1).  If p = pM = p2, then social welfare is 
(11)   WD(pM) = qw(y1, d*(y1)) + (1 – q)w(y2, d*(y2)) – c(p2) = W* – c(p2), 
which is to say that outcomes are perfect, but at a cost of c(p2).  If discretion is given, it 
will be optimal to choose the p corresponding to  
(12) WD* = max(WD, WD(pm), WD(pM)). 
Discretion will be socially desirable when WD* exceeds WND.  We can summarize as 
follows. 
PROPOSITION 4.  Random monitoring of adjudicators may be desirable, in which case the 
optimal monitoring probability may be such as to eliminate some or all discretionary 
deviation (as determined by (12) and whether or not WD* > WND).   
  In the example we have considered, (9) becomes (1 – pi)(0 + (1 – k)
2yi
2) = piz, or 
pi =  (1 – k)
2yi
2/(z + (1 – k)
2yi
2).  Note therefore that pi is increasing in yi (which makes 
sense, since higher yi leads to greater discretionary deviation) and decreasing the closer k 
is to 1 (for this reduces discretionary deviation).  From this expression for pi, the rest of 
the analysis of the example can be carried out. 
  It should be noted that we took the penalty z for discretionary deviation as a 
given, but this may often be chosen by the state, and the higher is z, the lower is pi.  
                                                                                                                                                 
22 A more general analysis would allow for a penalty schedule, such that the penalty would depend 
on the degree of discretionary deviation.    
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since that lowers pi, it lowers c(pi) and thus raises social welfare.  This is an example of 
the well-known point of Becker (1968) that social resources can be saved by raising the 
sanction and lowering the probability, so as to maintain deterrence.    
  Also, as was mentioned in section 1C, it was assumed that when yi was observed, 
discretionary deviation would be corrected and the penalty z imposed, but this implicitly 
presumes that the monitoring agent will do that.  That in turn raises the question of how 
the monitoring agent (who presumably has his own utility function) is induced to act as 
supposed.   
E.  Control of discretion through the appeals process
23
  Next suppose that there is an appeals process, meaning that a disappointed litigant 
can have the adjudicator’s decision reconsidered by a reviewing tribunal if he bears an 
appeals cost c.  It is assumed that the reviewing tribunal can determine y and will correct 
any discretionary deviation; thus, if an appeal is made, d*(yi) will be the decision.  Since 
an appeal will result in d*(yi), a litigant will bring an appeal when an adjudicator makes 
decision d if and only if the value to him of correcting the discretionary deviation exceeds 
the appeals cost c.  To be explicit, suppose that a litigant’s utility as a function of the 
decision is v(d), where v is either monotonic or concave in d.
24  The litigant will make an 
appeal when v(d*(yi)) – v(d) > c.  Assume also that adjudicators can predict whether a 
decision would instigate an appeal by a litigant (they can do this if they know c and the 
litigant’s utility function v(d)).  
                                                 
23 [I am developing the general point of this section -- that the appeals process induces 
adjudicators to mold their decisions so as to avoid appeal – in a separate article.  See.] 
 
24 For simplicity, it is assumed that litigants’ utility does not depend on y. 
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choose either his preferred decision d(yi) or, if this would lead to appeals, his best 
decision that would not provoke appeals.  To demonstrate this, first note that if d(yi) = 
d*(yi), the claims are trivially true.  Hence, assume that d(yi) is not equal to d*(yi), so the 
preferred decision of the adjudicator involves deviation from the socially best decision.  
If his choosing d(yi) would not result in an appeal, the adjudicator will choose d(yi), and 
no appeal will be brought.  If d(yi) would result in an appeal, then the adjudicator will not 
choose a decision that would lead to an appeal: for there will often exist a decision d that 
is sufficiently close to d*(yi) that it will not result in an appeal but will be better for him 
than d*(yi), in which case he will not want to provoke an appeal; and if no such d exists, 
we can assume he would choose d*(yi).
25
The appeals process can only raise social welfare. The reason is that the threat of 
an appeal might cause the adjudicator to change his decision, and any change in his 
decision must be one that enhances social welfare.  To be specific, if under the appeals 
process, d(yi) would not be appealed, the adjudicator will clearly choose d(yi), and the 
appeals process will have no effect on social welfare.  Thus assume that d(yi) would be 
appealed, and for concreteness assume that d(yi) > d*(yi) (the other case is analogous and 
will not be treated).  Then we know that the adjudicator will change his decision to a new 
decision that will not be appealed.  If he changes it to d*(yi), social welfare will be 
higher, so the claim is proved.  The other case is that he changes the decision to dN  
different from d*(yi).  Now dN  cannot exceed d(yi), for such a dN  would be appealed: if a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
25 If he were to provoke an appeal, he would be no better off, since the decision would be d*(yi); 
and if we were to assume that there is any penalty for being reversed, he would strictly prefer choosing 
d*(yi) in this case.  
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monotonic or concave, this means that v(d(yi)) > v(dN) for any dN >  d(yi); hence v(d*(yi)) 
- v(dN) > v(d*(yi)) – v(d(yi)), so that dN  too would have been appealed.   Also, dN  cannot 
be less than d*(yi), for since the adjudicator prefers d(yi) to d*(yi) and d(yi) > d*(yi), the 
assumption that u is concave implies that he prefers d*(yi) to and lesser dN.  We conclude 
that dN  must be in the interval (d*(yi), d(yi)), and since social welfare is concave, this 
means that dN  increases social welfare from its level if d(yi) had been chosen.  Thus the 
claim is established. 
 It follows from the above argument that, public subsidy of the appeals process 
can only raise social welfare.  Specifically, the argument that no appeals will actually 
occur applies regardless of whether appeals are subsidized; hence, subsidy of the appeals 
process does not affect social welfare due to any resource cost but only by altering 
adjudicator decisions.  The proof of the previous paragraph that the appeals process can 
only raise social welfare can be modified to establish the claim that subsidy of the 
appeals process can only raise social welfare.  Under subsidy of the appeals process, the 
private cost of an appeal falls.  Consider the dN  that the adjudicator chooses before 
subsidy of the appeals process.  If after subsidy, he still chooses dN, then there is no 
change in social welfare.  If, though, he does change his decision from dN, it must be that 
dN  would be appealed given subsidy of the appeals process.  If that is so, then he cannot 
choose a new decision dO  that exceeds dN, for such a dO  would be appealed (as before by 
the assumption that v is monotonic or concave), and dO  cannot be less than d*(yi).  Hence 
dO  must lie in [d*(yi), dN], implying that social welfare is higher under dO than under dN. 
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subsidy of the appeals process – making appeal free for litigants –  the first-best outcome 
will result if there is always a litigant who would prefer to eliminate discretionary 
deviation.  
The various conclusions we have reached are summarized in the next result. 
PROPOSITION 5.  Under the appeals process, no appeals are actually made, and the 
adjudicator selects his best decision that will not provoke appeal.  The appeals process 
can only increase social welfare.  Subsidy of appeals is desirable, and the first-best 
outcome results under complete subsidy of appeals provided that some litigant is always 
better off without discretionary deviation.   
Let us illustrate how the appeals process affects outcomes assuming that w(y, d) = 
– (d – y)
2,  u(y, d) = – (d – 2y)
2, v(d) = – (11 – d)
2,  y = 10, and c = 1.  In this case, the 
socially best decision is 10, the adjudicator’s choice is 20 in the absence of appeals, the 
litigant’s best decision is 11.  Here the litigant would appeal d = 20, and in fact all d 
above 12.  Hence, the adjudicator would choose d = 12, and social welfare would rise 
since 12 is only 2 away from 10. 
  The effect of whether there are one or two litigants was not emphasized above, 
but it clearly matters, as noted in the informal analysis.  For if there are two litigants with 
opposing interests, appeals will more often be brought, and thus discipline the adjudicator 
more than if there is only one litigant.  (The conclusion that if at least one of the litigants 
always prefers d*(yi) to any other decision, the first best outcome will be achieved if 
appeals are fully subsidized illustrates this point.) 
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not hold if any of a number of assumptions are relaxed: if adjudicators do not have 
perfect information about litigants, so that they cannot predict when litigants will appeal a 
decision, or if litigants do not have perfect information about appeals court behavior so 
do not know when an appeal will succeed, appeals will occur.  
  Also, it was assumed that the reviewing tribunal can determine d*(yi), meaning 
that it can observe yi. This assumption may be reasonable when the explanation for the 
noninclusion of yi is that the framers of laws found it too expensive to specify ex ante but 
when the the explanation for the exclusion of yi from the rule is difficulty in observing yi, 
then the assumption is not appropriate.   In any event, it must be presumed that the 
reviewing authorities do not themselves suffer from discretionary bias.   
 from  d(yi) to dN, where dN  results in lower social welfare than d(yi).  
Without imposing restrictions on the utility functions of adjudicators and of litigants, 
there is no bar to this happening.
26   
F. Comparison of methods of control 
  As stated in the informal analysis, each of the methods has an advantage over the 
other.  The use of decision-based incentives r(d) is plausibly less expensive than 
monitoring, as it involves only the administration of a reward based on an observable.  
Monitoring, however, involves expense since it requires duplicate consideration of cases.  
But monitoring can better affect behavior than decision-based incentives as it can 
                                                 
26 For example, suppose that d is non-negative, w(y, d) = – (d – y)
2, and u(y, d) = –  (d – .5y)
2.  
Suppose that y = 1, so that d*(1) = 1 and d(1) = .5.  Suppose that v(d) = 10 – 10d for d in [0, .5], that v(d) = 
4.5 + d for d in [.5, 1], that v(d) is decreasing for d above 1, and that c = 0.  Then d of .5 would be appealed 
as would any higher d unequal to 1 (for d = 1 maximizes v(d) for d $ .5).  Also, if d is in (.45, .5) it will be 
appealed.  At d = .45 and below, d will not be appealed.  The adjudicator will therefore choose d = .45, for 
it is best for him among d that will not be appealed and is superior to d = 1 but lowers social welfare.  
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involve cost in the model, since appeals are never made (although they would be were 
various simplifying assumptions relaxed); hence the appeals process holds an advantage 
over monitoring.  But the appeals process does not generally eliminate discretionary 
deviation but only limits its magnitude. 
G. Generalization of the model 
In a general version of the model, suppose that the unincluded variable y is drawn 
from some abstract set Y, over which there is a probability distribution F, and suppose 
that the decision d is chosen from some abstract set of possible decisions D.  Then WD  
and WND(d) are defined essentially as before, namely 
(1N)    WD  =  Iw(y, d(y))dF(y), 
            Y 
and  
 
(2N)   WND(d) =  Iw(y, d)dF(y). 
                             Y 
 
Also, d* maximizes (2N) over d,  so that  
 
(3N)    WND(d*)  =  Iw(y, d*)dF(y). 
                    Y 
It appears that analogues to the above propositions could then be shown. [To be 
completed.] 
H. Relationship to the Principal and Agent Literature 
The model considered here can be regarded as a version of a principal and agent 
model, where the principal is society and the agent is the adjudicator.
27  The reason that 
this model examined here resembles a principal and agent model is that the general 
question addressed was how to maximize the principal’s expected utility subject to the 
                                                 
27 [For a treatment of the principal and agent literature, see for example, Stiglitz (1987), Pratt and 
Zeckhauser ().] 
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information principal and agent model, since the agent observes y and makes decisions 
based on his private knowledge of  y.)  There is, however, a crucial difference between 
the model here and the models studied in the principal and agent literature. 
In the model here, it was supposed that society’s utility w is not observable by 
society, so that the adjudicator’s payoff cannot depend on it.  By contrast, in the principal 
and agent literature, it is usually assumed that the principal’s payoff is contractible, so 
that the agent’s payoff can depend on it.  This difference is important, for the principal’s 
ability to induce the agent to promote the principal’s expected payoff is obviously 
enhanced if he can make the agent’s payoff depend directly on it.  Indeed, were social 
welfare w observable and contractible in the model studied here, the first-best outcome 
could be achieved simply by giving the adjudicator a reward of z = w/t (see below).
28  
However, as was explained (see section 3C), the appropriate assumption here is that 
social welfare, such as the welfare consequences of the sentencing of a particular 
criminal, is not observable by society.  
A second difference between the model studied here and the principal and agent 
literature is that here, unlike in that literature, it was not assumed that the agent’s 
expected utility was constrained to be at least equal to a reservation level.  However, this 
difference is mainly due to expositional convenience.  Were there a constraint on the 
adjudicator-agent’s expected utility, the qualitative nature of the conclusions would be 
largely unaltered.  To amplify, suppose that adjudicators are paid a wage z that is 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
28 Then the adjudicator’s objective in choosing his decision d would be to maximize u(y, d) + w(y, 
d)/t for every y, or equivalently, to maximize w(y, d) + tu(y, d) for every y, which is the priniciple’s 
objective in choosing d as well, since this equivalent to (13) (after substituting using  (15)).  
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adjudicator’s expected utility be ".  Also, assume society bears a cost tz for payment of z, 
where t is public cost of raising funds, so society’s total utility is w(y, d) – tz.  Then, 
society’s problem is 
(13)   Maximize Ew(y, d) – tz   
subject to the constraint that, for each y, the agent chooses d to maximize  
(14)   u(y, d) + z  
over the permissible scope of decisions, and to the constraint that  
(15)    Eu(y, d) + z =  ".  
Now reconsider the analysis of the question when discretion is desirable to allow.  If 
discretion is not allowed, then for any d, the agent is forced to choose this d, so that (14) 
is trivially satisfied, and from (15), z = " – Eu(y, d).  Thus social welfare is Ew(y, d) – t(" 
– Eu(y, d)), and let d* be the optimal d.  If discretion is allowed, d is chosen freely in 
(14).  Because z is separable from u, the d that would be chosen is d(y) as described 
above, that maximizing u(y, d).  Thus, social welfare is Ew(y, d(y)) – t(" – Eu(y, d(y))).  
Hence, discretion is optimal to allow when Ew(y, d(y)) – t(" – Eu(y, d(y))) > Ew(y, d*) – 
t(" – Eu(y, d*)), or when  
(16)      Ew(y, d(y)) +  t(Eu(y, d(y)) – Eu(y, d*)) >  Ew(y, d*).
Before (see (3) and (4) in section 3A) discretion was desirable simply when 
Ew(y, d(y)) >  Ew(y, d*).   But here, in (16), discretion is desirable more often, since 
Eu(y, d(y)) – Eu(y, d*) is positive.  The reason that discretion is desirable more often is 
that Eu(y, d(y)) – Eu(y, d*) is the gain in adjudicator expected utility when discretion is 
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to satisfy the reservation utility constraint "; in other words, society saves resources when 
it grants discretion.  If we were to reconsider other parts of the analysis, the change would 
be similar to that just discussed.  Namely, the condition under which controlling 
discretion would be desirable would alter, and this would be desirable less often, since 
controlling discretion would involve a higher salary cost.  But the manner in which 
control of discretion would be used, and the comparison between methods of control, 
would be essentially as stated above.  [To be completed.] 
4.  Conclusion 
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